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I 
  Robert Nozick, in chapter two of the nature of rationality, proposes two famous problems in 
decision theory (i.e., Newcomb's problem and Prisoner Dilemma) and two main strategies toward 
these problems i.e. dominant strategy and dominated or cooperative one. He will try to give a 
formal principles to calculate the decision values in these situations. In this calculation he goes 
beyond the standard principle of maximizing expected utility and would try to put forth less ideal 
and more realistic principles that fit the decision situation in the real world. As he mentioned 
himself: 
" The framework of decision-values, with its incorporated weights that can be altered over 
time, is one way that a fetting to the actual world can be accomplished." (Nozick, 1993, p 
48).   
He does not emphasize just strategies (joint or individual) but he does pay attention to the amount 
of the outcomes in each case and its effects on the decision-making process. He discusses three 
different modes of connection between action and outcomes which he calls causal, evidential, and 
symbolic modes. Finally, he concludes that a joint strategy is rational in some special cases and 
under some conditions. He presents his DV principles as a criterion of rationality including three 
kinds of outcomes and the Wight assigned to each of them. 
 
 
1.1 One instance of prisoner's dilemma: 
Nozick begins with a familiar instance of prisoner's dilemma:  
"A sheriff offers each of two imprisoned persons awaiting trial the following options. If one 
prisoner confesses and the other does not, the first does not go to jail and the second will receive 
a twelve-year sentence; if both confess, each receives a ten-year prison sentence; if both do not 
confess, each receives a two-year sentence. Figure 2 represents the situation they face, where the 
entries in the matrix represent the number of years to be served in prison by the first and second 







Dominant vs. Cooperative (dominated) 
In this instance, each party's selection of a (strongly) dominant action which is based on individual 
strategy leaves each of them worse off [10,10] than if each had chosen the more cooperative 
dominated action [2,2]. "The combination of (what appears to be) their individual rationalities 
leads them to forgo an attainable better situation and thus is Pareto-suboptimal. [equilibrium]" 






2.1 Argument for dominance action. 
First, He mentions the two familiar arguments for dominant and cooperative approaches and then 
he begins to present his new insights. For dominate strategy he states that: 
 
"Each prisoner reasons "If the other person confesses and I don't, I will receive twelve years 
in prison; whereas if I do confess, I will receive ten years. If the other person doesn't confess 
and I don't, I will receive two years in prison; whereas if I do, I will receive no years at all. 
In either case, whichever thing the other person does, I am better off confessing rather than 
not. Therefore, I will confess." (Nozick, 1993, p 50) 
And for cooperation strategy he says: 
"Some people have argued that a rational person in this situation, knowing that the other 
also is a rational person who knows as much about the situation as he himself does, will 
realize that any reasoning convincing to himself will be convincing to the other as well. So 
if he concludes the dominant action is best, the other person will as well; if he concludes 
the cooperative action is best, the other person will as well. In this situation, then, it would 
be better to conclude the cooperative action is best and, realizing all this, he therefore 




He assumes that all agents have some common knowledge that others are rational persons and they 
are roughly aware of their dispositions based on this common knowledge. It seems that this 
situation is more similar to translucent cases in Nozick articles.  
 
 
 In response to this question that "What should rational agents do?" Nozick respectively present 
three concepts referring to three kinds of relation between actions and outcomes, and concludes 
that each of them has some effects in our decision value.  
 
Assuming that Standard utility is the sum of the utilities of its (exclusive) possible outcomes, 
weighted by their probabilities, which sum to 1.  
EU(A) = prob(O1) u(O1) + prob(O2) u(O2) + . . . + prob(On) u(On),  
 
We can define the first two moods as follows: 
Evidential expected utility(EEU): 
refers the outcomes which are not probabilistically independent of the actions, and "specifies the 
expected utility as weighted not by the simple probabilities of the outcomes but by the conditional 
probabilities of the outcomes given the actions. "(Nozick, 1993, p 43) 
 
EEU(A) = prob(O1/A) . u(O1) + prob(O2/A) . u(O2) + . . . + prob(On/A) u(On),  
 
Causal expected utility(CEU): 
Refers to the "causal decision theorists too use not simply the unconditional probability of the 
outcome but a probability relating the outcome to the action, this time not simply the conditional 
probability, prob(Oi/ A), but some causal-probabilistic relation indicating direct causal influence. 
"in CEU we still have conditional probability however we count just causal relation between 
actions and outcomes, not merely and evidential relation. The formula of utility calculating for 
CEU maximizer is the same of that of EEU, however, form CEU maximizer the probability of 
(O/A) in evidential cases is 0 – not defined. 
 
So, "Causal decision theory recommends performing the dominant action; evidential decision 
theory recommends performing the cooperative action when you think the other party is relevantly 
similar to yourself." (Nozick, 1993, p 52) 
According to Nozick, decision value of each action is not simply defined just with standard 
expected utility maximization principle, but with a more complicated formula which gives some 
weight to CEU and EEU as well.   
 
DV(A) = Wc . CEU(A) + We . EEU(A) 
Using two examples, Nozick shows that how the weight we give to CEU or EEU vary in different 
cases and how it has effective influence on DV.  
 
Example 1 :  CM is rational (Figure 4) 
In Figure 4 where "the matrix entries are such utility numbers, we would think that cooperation is 
the rational choice. In general, when the cooperative solution payoffs [optimal] are very much 
higher than the dominance ones [suboptimal], and when payoffs for the nonmatching actions offer 
 4 
only slight gains or losses over these two, then we strongly will think that cooperation is rational 
and will find that the dominance argument has little force." (Nozick, 1993, p 53) 
In this case optimal outcome (1000) is much better than dominate outcome (1) and maximum 
outcome (1001) is just a little bit better than optimal one. So, an agent (whose is straightforward 
maximizer) prefer to follow EEU and would choose optimal outcomes which is no risky. 
[optimal >> suboptimal] 





Example 2: dominant is rational (Figure 5) 
However, in figure 5, "the cooperation solution is only slightly better than the dominant one, and 
the extreme values in the payoffs for the nonmatching actions diverge greatly. When we have no 
special ties to the other party or particular knowledge of the other party's probabilities of action, 
then we will think it is rational to perform the dominant action in the figure 5 situation, not running 
any risk that the other party will perform his dominant action, which he has a large incentive to 
do. (And if I go through this reasoning and think he also is very likely to be like me, then I may 
well settle upon the dominant action in this case, comfortable with the realization that he will also.) 
"(Nozick, 1993, p 53) 
In this case, a maximum outcome (500) is much greater than the optimal (3) and the optimal one 
is just a little bit better than the dominant (2) outcome. So, in this cases the agent who gives more 
weight to CEU ignore any evidential utility just because the fact that from his point of view, the 
only acceptable probability is that of causal relation. So, form a CEU maximizer the value of EEU 
would be 0.  
 
[Maximum >> optimal] 
[optimal is just slightly better than suboptimal] 
[Risk is low, for I gain either 500 or 2 






2.2. The Impact of the weight assigned to CEU and EEU  
"These shifts in the decision one would make, which depend upon the (ratios of the differences in 
the) particular numerical utility entries in the matrix, are in accordance with the earlier principle 
of maximizing decision-value for people who give some weight to each of the particular principles 
CEU and EEU. At what precise point a person's decision will shift as the utilities are varied will 
depend upon how confident she is in each of these principles (that is, what weights she implicitly 
assigns to them) and also upon the probabilities she assigns to the other person's action being the 
same as her own." (Nozick, 1993, p 48) 
 
2.3 The Third mode: Symbolic utility  
Due to a more realistic theory for rationality, Nozick states that in the real world our actions have 
some symbolic value and it greatly effects on our relationship with others. He means that in 
addition to CEU and EEU there is still another relationship between action and outcome which is 
applied in a broader scope. Nozick states that "Yet the symbolic value of an act is not determined 
solely by that act. The act's meaning can depend upon what other acts are available with what 
payoffs and what acts also are available to the other party or parties. What the act symbolizes is 
something it symbolizes when done in that particular situation, in preference to those particular 
alternatives." (Nozick, 1993, p 48) 
 
Nozick defines SU as follows: 
"The symbolic utility of an action A is determined by A's having symbolic connections to 
outcomes (and perhaps to other actions) that themselves have the standard kind of utility, 
just as the CEU of A is determined by A's causal-probabilistic connections to outcomes 
with the standard utility." (Nozick, 1993, p 48) 
 
Taking SU into account, Nozick final DV formula would be as follows: 
 
DV(A) = Wc . CEU(A) + We . EEU(A) + Ws . SU(A). 
 
SU is the utility of the various out-comes and actions symbolized by the act, with its own associated 





He believes that SU is a utility applied to an action rather than an outcome. And SU, like CEU and 
EEU, is not a different kind of utility, but it is just a third relationship between action and outcomes. 
"Symbolic utility is not a different kind of utility, standing to standard utility in something like the 
way that metaphorical meaning stands to literal. Rather, symbolic utility is a different kind of 
connection—symbolic—to the familiar kind of utility. It stands alongside the already familiar 
connections, the causal and the evidential." (Nozick, 1993, p 48) 
 
Contextualism aims at a rational decision based on the relevant items in the context (Afroogh 2019; 
Afroogh 2021), and Nozick will follow a version of this approach. According to Nozick , SU can 
be the value of cooperative action is some cases However, it doesn't mean that SU equals to the 
value of cooperation strategy. The SU might be the value of acting individually in a decision 
situation, and it completely relevant to contexts and agents character. As Nozick mention in the 
las part of his clarification on SU: 
"To say all this about symbolic utility is to say that our responses to the Prisoner's Dilemma 
are governed, in part, by our view of the kind of person we wish to be and the kinds of 
ways we wish to relate to others. What we do in a particular Prisoner's Dilemma situation 
will involve all this and invoke it to different degrees depending upon the precise (ratios of 
differences among) utility entries in the matrix and also upon the particular factual 
circumstances that give rise to that matrix, circumstances in which an action may come to 
have its own symbolic meanings, not simply because of the structure of the matrix." 




2.4 Decision value formula by Nozick 
So, the decision-value of the act for him will depend upon all three of these things—its SU, CEU, 
and EEU—and upon the weights he gives to these. Thus,  
DV(A) = Wc . CEU(A) + We . EEU(A) + Ws . SU(A).  
(Nozick, 1993, p 56-57) 
So, cooperative action is not always the rational decision. The cooperative action will be performed 
if the causal, evidential, and symbolic utilities interact so as to lead to this. 
 So, "The framework of decision-values, with its incorporated weights that can be altered over 








In contrary, Nozick is not a cooperation fan and he defends of cooperation strategy only if his DV 
formula leads us to it. he presents very effective insights and helpful suggestion to make a more 
realistic theory on rationality in these cases. Proposing three causal, evidential and symbolic items, 
his theory would explain more commonsensical extensions and it shows that it has more 
explanatory power.   
 7 
Two reflections 
1.It seems to that if we want to have a more realist theory on rationality, we need to consider some 
more items including morality.  
Hobbes believes that it is not reasonable to be unjust, because it is not reasonable to believe that 
doing so you can maximize your utility; And Gauthier (1990) and Nozick agree that the most 
important way to prove the rationality of a strategy is to calculate EU for the agent, however, they 
disagree about different items that are involved in this calculation. So, it seems that all of them 
presuppose very strong link between rationality and egoism. A strategy is rational if and only if 
you can maximize your expected utility. The only difference between Nozick and Gauthier is that 
he is a smarter egoist person who, in addition to straight EU, pay attention to three other important 
item to maximize his utility.  
However, in the real world, sometimes we see that a rational person decides in a way that maximize 
just the expected utility of her partner. Assume a prisoner (B) who is very good and moral person, 
and based on his altruistic belief, he wants to take a strategy which maximize her partner's utility. 
And imaging that her partner is an orphan kid which is not a very rational person and high probably 
will do based on individual strategy. So, the kid will get no year sentence, and B will get 12 years 




What is meant by "utility" is not just monitory or material values. You can consider the moral 
value as the utility which you expect to maximize through doing some action. Utility would be 
defined based on your believes and desires whatsoever. So, for B the utility of being 12 years in 
prison would be the maximized utility.  
 
2. Given that constrained maximization proposed by Gauthier is a theory of rationality and is a 
criterion for rationality, and that would be the best answer for the main questions in prisoner's 
dilemma i.e. "Which of them is rational decision maker, SM or CM?" 
"What should rational agents do? SM or CM" 
Then, what definition of rationality Is presupposed in these questions? Isn't it circular? 
 
Reply: 
It seems that it would be circular discussion on rationality, however it is not a vicious circularity. 
It seems that what is happening here is analogous to reflective equilibrium method in conceptual 
analysis of knowledge by epistemologists. The reflective equilibrium method in epistemology is 
used to give the best theory which explains the most commonsensical extensions of 'knowledge' 
in the ordinary language, however, here it seems that this method is used here to explain some 
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